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ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN ARKANSAS AFTER CONCEPCION 
John C. Williams* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are few constitutional rights that may not be waived. A criminal 
defendant may testify at his own trial and thereby waive his Fifth Amend-
ment right against incrimination.1 A criminal suspect may waive her Fourth 
Amendment right to require the police to obtain a warrant before searching 
her home.2 The right guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment—that parties 
are entitled to a jury in any matter “at common law” where the amount in 
controversy is over twenty dollars—is no different.3 Waiver of the Seventh 
Amendment right may occur in several forms: by consenting to a bench tri-
al, for example, or by failing to file a timely jury demand.4 But another, 
more troubling type of Seventh Amendment waiver has become increasingly 
prevalent—waiver via arbitration clause. 
An arbitration clause is nothing more than a contractual declaration that 
the parties forfeit their right to litigate disputes in court. Instead, disputes 
will be submitted to a (theoretically neutral) arbitrator, who will apply speci-
fied arbitral rules. Where the contracting parties are on equal footing, arbi-
tration is a beneficial procedure. It preserves judicial resources while allow-
ing sophisticated actors to resolve their disputes. Disagreements between 
nations, between business entities, and between labor unions and manage-
ment are all good candidates for arbitration. The key assumption, however, 
is that these parties have indeed agreed to arbitrate. If not, courts of compe-
tent jurisdiction remain available. 
 
*	  J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; Associate, Carney Bates & Pulliam, PLLC. 
Thanks to David Slade for encouraging me to undertake this project.	  
 1. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987) (“[A] suspect may waive his 
Fifth Amendment privilege, ‘provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently.’”). 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170–71 (1974) (explaining that 
warrantless search may be justified by the consent of a defendant or someone with common 
authority over premises). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The requirement that the suit be “at common law” is not 
self-explanatory and raises a host of issues by itself. Suffice it to say that, under the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence, the right to a jury trial generally applies to suits that allege a claim for 
damages. See Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In Suits at Common Law”, 71 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1071, 1071–83 (2010) (explaining development of the “at common law” re-
quirement). 
 4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) (“A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly 
served and filed.”). 
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Contrast a dispute between a large corporation and its customer. Cor-
porations frequently insert arbitration clauses into form contracts that cus-
tomers are required to sign in order to receive (often essential) goods and 
services. A nursing home may require its patient or her representative to 
sign a contract containing an arbitration clause, or a phone company may 
bury an arbitration clause in fine print that it is well understood no custom-
er—even a sophisticated one—will read. Here, the waiver of the jury-trial 
right is more problematic. Typically the key criterion for a waiver of consti-
tutional rights is that the waiver be consensual. Simply stated, a person must 
be acting voluntarily when giving up a right.5 But that criterion is not pre-
sent when a consumer signs a contract because she has no choice if she 
wants to receive the service, or if she does not even know that the contract 
she is signing contains an arbitration clause. Indeed, one might question 
whether there can ever be a meaningful waiver of the jury right through con-
sumer contracts of adhesion. It is safe to say that, unless the consumer is a 
lawyer, the notion of future litigation does not enter a consumer’s mind 
when she is purchasing a good or service. She needs the good or service 
now and does not care about the fine print. No person forfeits his Fourth or 
Fifth Amendment right via contract years in advance. He forfeits these 
rights when faced with the police search or with the opportunity of testify-
 
 5. This formulation simplifies the issue somewhat. “Consent” can mean many different 
things. For example, to consent to waive his Fourth Amendment right, must a suspect know 
that he may deny a police officer’s request to conduct a search? The Supreme Court has said 
no. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973). Instead, the suspect’s 
consent to search must be “not the result of duress or coercion.” Id. Contrast that to trial 
rights guaranteed under the Constitution, waiver of which must be “knowing and intelligent.” 
See id. at 237–38. Lack of duress is not enough—the defendant must actually know that it is a 
right he is waiving. See id. And the level of consent required to bind oneself to a contract is 
even lower, generally requiring only an objective manifestation that the party agreed to be 
bound. See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contrac-
tual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 170–76 (2004) (dis-
cussing difference between contractual consent and “knowing” consent). The question that 
has divided commentators is whether a lower standard is permissible or knowledge of the 
jury-trial waiver should be shown. See id. Moreover, the courts have sent mixed signals about 
whether a “knowing” waiver of a jury trial is required in the context of arbitration. See David 
Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 605, 641 (2010) (“[I]t is unclear whether the ‘voluntary and informed’ rule will remain 
good law. This fact-specific inquiry seems to conflict with the fact that courts routinely en-
force arbitration clauses—which implicitly waive the right to a jury trial—even when there is 
copious evidence that the adherent did not know about the clause.”). 
  Ultimately, the standard one favors depends on how highly one values the right 
under discussion. If one is especially concerned about warrantless searches, Schneckloth’s 
standard is not good enough. This Article is not intended to develop a theory on how jealous-
ly the jury-trial right should be guarded or to otherwise engage the debate, other than to sug-
gest that, as a general matter, a meaningful relinquishment of a right requires a conscious 
choice. 
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ing. In a similar vein, a truly knowing waiver of the Seventh Amendment 
right can only occur at the moment of truth—that is, when a dispute arises 
and the prospect of litigation or arbitration has entered the person’s mind. 
How federal and Arkansas jurisprudence reflect these concerns is the 
subject of this Article. In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has 
been clear that arbitration clauses in consumer contracts of adhesion should 
be enforced, no matter what the power dynamics between the contracting 
parties.6 These cases hold that federal law preempts state law disfavoring 
arbitration. As such, they would seem to leave state courts little room to 
maneuver when they are faced with demands to compel arbitration. Yet state 
courts—and Arkansas courts in particular—have proven Houdini-like in 
escaping the logic of the federal cases. They have done so by using the last 
redoubt of state law in this area—the law of contract formation.7 By raising 
the bar for the legal formation of arbitration agreements, Arkansas courts 
have mitigated some of the harshest effects of consumer arbitration clauses 
and have, at least through the backdoor, prevented these clauses from being 
enforced without the consumer’s true consent. At the same time, however, 
the Arkansas approach has raised important questions of federalism in an 
arena that was already full of them. 
Part II of this Article examines federal cases governing the enforceabil-
ity of consumer arbitration clauses. This Part focuses on the landmark case 
of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion8—which holds that the Federal Arbi-
tration Act (FAA)9 preempts state laws that disfavor arbitration—and exam-
ines how federal courts and state courts outside Arkansas have reacted to the 
ruling. Part III then turns to Arkansas’s unique approach to arbitration—an 
approach that has been amplified by a set of Arkansas Supreme Court cases 
decided in 2014. Part IV discusses the viability of these Arkansas cases in 
light of the recent expansion of FAA preemption. It concludes that the Ar-
kansas approach does not run afoul of the FAA, a result that should apply in 
both state and federal court. Finally, it suggests that this outcome is a salu-
tary one for reasons of federalism as well as fundamental fairness. 
II. THE NEW LAW OF ARBITRATION PREEMPTION 
Though arbitration has been written into the federal statutes for ninety 
years, it is only relatively recently—within the last thirty years—that the 
FAA has acquired any real teeth. In the past five years, those teeth have be-
come sharper. This Part explains how the U.S. Supreme Court has expanded 
 
 6. See infra Part II.A. 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
 8. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307 (2013). 
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the scope of the FAA and how lower federal courts have reacted to the Su-
preme Court’s apparent mandate to enforce arbitration clauses without re-
gard to state law. 
A. Concepcion and Amex 
Arbitration has been the subject of federal law since 1925. In that year, 
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act to combat general judicial hos-
tility to arbitration.10 The FAA effectively created a new body of federal 
substantive law, though one that has accrued meaning only in the past three 
decades through U.S. Supreme Court interpretations.11 
The FAA’s crucial language appears at 9 U.S.C. § 2: 
A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.  
Thus, so long as the contract governs a transaction occurring in inter-
state commerce—not a difficult bar to meet12—then a court asked to enforce 
an arbitration agreement must do so unless there is a general contract de-
fense to the arbitration agreement. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear 
that the question is whether there is a contract defense to an arbitration 
agreement itself—if a party offers a defense to the contract as a whole in-
stead of the arbitration provision alone, then the arbitration clause must be 
enforced.13 Unless the clause specifically reserves a general contract defense 
 
 10. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 592–93 (2008) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“Prior to the passage of the FAA, American courts were generally hostile to 
arbitration.”). 
 11. See Horton, supra note 5, at 613, 619–23 (discussing historical expansion of the 
FAA). 
 12. Though seemingly every commercial transaction involves interstate commerce, it is 
not unheard of for Arkansas courts to avoid the FAA by finding that the parties were in-
volved solely in intrastate activities. See Ark. Diagnostic Ctr., P.A. v. Tahiri, 370 Ark. 157, 
166–67 (2007). As the FAA has expanded, so too has the notion of what sort of transactions 
occur in interstate commerce for the purpose of the FAA. As one commentator has explained, 
“even after the Supreme Court enlarged Congress’s Commerce Clause powers in the 1940s, it 
refused to equivalently broaden the FAA.” See Horton, supra note 5, at 614. However, by the 
1990s, the Supreme Court had made clear that the FAA covers any sort of activity that Con-
gress would be permitted to regulate under the Commerce power. See Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (interpreting the phrase “involving commerce” as 
“extending the Act’s reach to the limits of Congress’ Commerce Clause power”). 
 13. This so-called Prima Paint rule—named after Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967), the case in which it was estab-
lished—is discussed infra Part IV.A, as is the rule’s relationship to Arkansas law. 
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to the court, the arbitrator will decide the validity of the general defense.14 It 
is also well established that the FAA has preemptive effect—that is, it must 
be enforced in state as well as federal court and trumps any general state-law 
bans on arbitration.15  
Sweeping as these rules are, they appear to be cabined by the savings 
clause of § 2 of the FAA. By reserving to the states their general contract 
defenses—“such grounds as exist at law or in equity”—§ 2 provides a seem-
ingly powerful means for parties to challenge arbitration clauses that were 
fraudulently, mistakenly, coercively, or unconscionably obtained. However, 
the savings clause was seriously limited in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion,16 a case with far-reaching implications for consumers, employees, and 
other parties who are subject to nonnegotiable contracts of adhesion. 
The facts of Concepcion are those of a run-of-the-mill class action. The 
plaintiffs enrolled in AT&T’s service based upon an offer that the service 
would come with free phones.17 When the plaintiffs learned they had been 
charged $30 sales tax for the phones, they brought suit for false advertising 
and fraud and sought to certify the case as a class action.18 However, their 
service contract contained a clause requiring bilateral arbitration—the plain-
tiffs were required to arbitrate only in their “individual capacity, and not as a 
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceed-
ing.”19 AT&T sought to arbitrate according to this clause, but the district 
court refused to compel arbitration.20 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding 
that the arbitration clause was unconscionable.21 Specifically, the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the so-called Discover rule, a rule of California law that prohib-
its class-action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion where the con-
sumer alleges a scheme to cheat consumers out of small amounts of mon-
ey.22 Finding that the Discover rule is an unconscionability defense that ex-
ists “for the revocation of any contract,” the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA 
did not compel enforcement of the arbitration agreement.23 
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the 
FAA preempts the Discover rule “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”24 The majority 
 
 14. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444–46 (2006). 
 15. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
 16. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 17. See id. at 1744. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1744–45. 
 21. Id. at 1745. 
 22. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745–46 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 
P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)). 
 23. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013); Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
 24. Id. at 1743, 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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explained that the most straightforward preemption analysis would occur 
where “state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of 
claim”—there, the state law plainly conflicts with the federal law and cannot 
stand.25 But the Discover rule was not such a law, and “the inquiry becomes 
more complex when a doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, 
such as duress or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to have 
been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.”26 The court then pro-
ceeded to explain that even state-law defenses that are generally applicable 
to all contracts—in the FAA’s terms, “grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract”—could be preempted if “[i]n practice . . . 
the rule would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.”27 
Did the Discover rule have a disproportionate impact on arbitration? 
Despite the “complex” analysis that the majority purported the problem to 
require, the case came down to a simple principle: class procedures are in-
compatible with arbitration, and thus with the FAA. As a result, any state-
law rule requiring the availability of class procedures (whether in litigation 
or arbitration) is an obstacle to the purposes of the FAA and may not be 
enforced to invalidate an existing agreement to arbitrate.28 Thus, though the 
savings clause of § 2 had appeared to sanction unconscionability analysis, 
Concepcion adds an extra layer of inquiry. The issue is not simply whether a 
state-law defense is available. Rather, Concepcion requires an inquiry into 
the practical effect of the state-law rule.29 If it “interferes with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration,” then it must yield to the FAA.30 
Arguably, Concepcion is narrow in scope. The Discover rule required 
parties to submit to class procedures that presumably would undermine the 
efficiency of arbitration.31 Indeed, Part III.B of the opinion—almost half the 
text—can be read as a paean to arbitration and its efficiency benefits.32 Oth-
er contract defenses—fraud, duress, mistake, and perhaps other forms of 
unconscionability—presumably lack an anti-arbitration bias and would 
withstand attack. Problematically, however, Concepcion does not state a 
clear rule of law, so this theory is difficult to assess. Ultimately, Concepcion 
 
 25. See id. at 1747 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)). 
 26. See id. at 1746–47. 
 27. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. 
 28. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1750. 
 29. See id. at 1746–48. As Peter Rutledge has explained, “[T]he mere fact that an anti-
arbitration rule falls within a generally applicable state contract doctrine supplies merely a 
necessary—but no longer a sufficient—condition for that rule to survive Section 2 preemp-
tion. Instead, the rule must undergo a second level of federal review.” PETER B. RUTLEDGE, 
ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 92 (2012). 
 30. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 31. See id. at 1746, 1750 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 
1110 (Cal. 2005)). 
 32. See id. at 1748–53. 
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commands courts to scrutinize state legal rules to determine whether their 
application is inconsistent with the “fundamental attributes of arbitration.”33 
Other than that, it supplies mainly color and tone—one that encourages the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses and makes that the easiest decision for 
courts faced with FAA preemption arguments. 
The Supreme Court employed a similar pro-arbitration tone in Ameri-
can Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (“Amex”).34 Plaintiffs, a group 
of merchants required to agree to defendant’s terms to accept American Ex-
press for payment, brought a federal antitrust claim to challenge defendant’s 
fees.35 However, defendant’s terms contained an arbitration agreement that 
forbade class arbitration.36 Rather than asserting a state-law defense to the 
arbitration clause as in Concepcion—indeed, they had no state claim—
plaintiffs invoked the “effective vindication” doctrine, a judicial rule that 
blocks enforcement of arbitration agreements when they prevent parties 
from pursuing federal statutory remedies.37 Specifically, plaintiffs argued 
that the arbitration clause—for reasons including but not limited to its pro-
hibition of class procedures—made it prohibitively expensive to pursue their 
claim.38 While an individual merchant’s maximum statutory remedy was 
about $38,000, the expert analysis needed to prove its antitrust theory could 
have cost more than $1 million.39 In other words, without a class mecha-
nism, an individual merchant could have paid $1 million in expert costs for 
a $38,000 judgment—hardly a rational economic choice. 
The majority rejected application of the effective-vindication doc-
trine.40 In doing so, it focused on the class arbitration ban and explained that 
“[t]ruth to tell, . . . AT&T Mobility all but resolves this case.”41 The majority 
saw the case as ultimately boiling down to a contest between arbitration and 
the prosecution of low-value claims—the same fundamental issue as in 
Concepcion.42 And in that contest, arbitration clearly won: “[T]he FAA’s 
command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring 
the prosecution of low-value claims.”43 
 
 33. See id. at 1748. 
 34. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 35. Id. at 2308. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 2310. 
 38. See id. at 2308, 2310–11. 
 39. See id. at 2308. 
 40. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–12. 
 41. See id. at 2312. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 2312 n.5. 
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B. Arbitration After Concepcion 
Concepcion and Amex suggest an obvious path to corporations wishing 
to avoid both litigation with consumers and class-wide procedures: simply 
insert an arbitration provision into the customer’s terms of service. Whether 
the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence has in fact led to a torrent of new 
arbitration clauses is an open question; for example, a recent study focused 
on franchise agreements and found that the use of arbitration clauses in 
those agreements had not increased as much as had been predicted.44 How-
ever, arbitration provisions have long been a favored approach to limiting 
consumer litigation.45 There is no reason to believe the use of those provi-
sions would do anything but increase in a post-Concepcion world.46 And 
while there may be other paths to restrict the use of arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts of adhesion—for example, the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Bureau has issued a study of the use of consumer arbitration claus-
es47 and has the authority to pass a rule limiting or prohibiting arbitration 
provisions in agreements for consumer financial products48—Concepcion 
and Amex are the status quo for now. 
What does that status quo mean from a practitioner’s standpoint? In 
terms of legal rules, Concepcion and Amex are absolutely clear on one point: 
 
 44. See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? 
The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 957–61 
(2014). 
 45. The use of consumer arbitration clauses seems to vary by product but is especially 
widespread in financial and telecommunications contracts. See Horton, supra note 5, at 607 
& n.8 (discussing study finding that seventy-five percent of consumer financial and telecom-
munications contracts contained an arbitration provision). 
 46. Indeed, Rutledge and Drahozal explain that there are reasons to believe the franchise 
agreements they reviewed will be less susceptible to respond to Concepcion than consumer 
agreements. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 44, at 983–84. And anecdotally, at least, 
corporate arbitration procedures appear to be responsive to Concepcion and Amex. The most 
publicized example of increased corporate boldness in the consumer-arbitration arena is 
General Mills’ recent revisions to its terms of service, which would make arbitration binding 
if a consumer downloaded coupons or interacted with the company in a number of other basic 
ways. See Stephanie Strom, When ‘Liking’ a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2014, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/business/when
-liking-a-brand-online-voids-the-right-to-sue.html?ref=business. The company quickly re-
tracted the policy in reaction to public uproar. See Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses 
Itself on Consumers’ Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, at A17, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/business/general-mills-reverses-itself-on-consumers-
right-to-sue.html?_r=0. 
 47. CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 
1028(A) (2015), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-
study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf. 
 48. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(b), 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5518(b) (2013). 
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if a state law forbids certain categories of claims from being arbitrated, then 
the FAA preempts that law. Both the Supreme Court49 and the lower federal 
courts50 have stood ready to enforce that principle.51 However, Concepcion 
is less clear about situations where state laws are applied in a manner that 
disfavors arbitration. On the one hand, Concepcion could be narrowly con-
strued as holding only that, because class procedures are incompatible with 
arbitration, a state cannot require arbitration to be conducted on a class-wide 
basis. However, the broad language of Concepcion and Amex appears to 
reach much beyond that basic idea. In light of this new landscape, what ar-
guments are available to parties seeking to avoid a consumer arbitration 
clause? 
1. Formation 
First, the parties might attempt to avoid a confusing preemption analy-
sis altogether by arguing that there was never an agreement to arbitrate in 
the first place. As the Supreme Court has explained, the purpose of the FAA 
is to “ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
their terms.”52 “[T]he FAA does not confer a right to compel arbitration of 
any dispute at any time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing 
that ‘arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties’] agree-
ment.’”53 Put even more directly, “the basic objective” of the FAA “is not to 
resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ 
wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other con-
tracts, are enforced according to their terms.”54 Indeed, even Concepcion 
 
 49. See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) 
(preempting state law rule that prevented arbitration of nursing home–related claims). 
 50. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the FAA preempts California rule preventing arbitration of claims for injunctive 
relief in certain circumstances). 
 51. Notably, the Arkansas Arbitration Act, which was passed in 2011, contains categori-
cal carve-outs preventing the use of arbitration agreements in tort, employment, and insur-
ance cases. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-230(b) (2010). These carve-outs unquestionably 
conflict with the FAA, and any state court that enforced them could expect a summary rever-
sal from the United States Supreme Court along the lines of Marmet. As one commentator 
has suggested, the approach the Arkansas Supreme Court has taken is perhaps an attempt to 
effectuate the spirit of the Arkansas Arbitration Act without running afoul of preemption 
doctrine. See Katherine B. Church, Comment, Arkansas and Mandatory Arbitration: Is the 
Feeling Really Mutual?, 65 ARK. L. REV. 343, 354, 378 (2012). The Arkansas Supreme 
Court’s approach is discussed in detail in Part III infra. 
 52. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
478 (1989). 
 53. Id. at 474–75 (alteration in original) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2013)). 
 54. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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confirmed the “fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of con-
tract.”55 Thus, if the parties did not contract to arbitrate in the first place, 
then arbitration is not a valid procedure. 
Arguments that parties did not have a valid agreement to arbitrate—or, 
more narrowly, that they did not agree to arbitrate the specific claim at issue 
in the case—are dependent upon contract wording as well as the particular 
facts surrounding the parties’ interactions. In federal court, at least, such 
arguments have been met with mixed success. And though formation argu-
ments technically avoid the preemption inquiry, they nonetheless may be-
come entangled in a broad preemption analysis and Concepcion’s pro-
arbitration approach. 
Where the court perceives the formation argument to hinge on the se-
mantic wording of the contract, the party seeking to avoid arbitration has a 
tough row to hoe. For example, in Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc.,56 the parties’ 
contract contained a clause saying that the arbitration provision was unen-
forceable if “the law of your state would find this agreement to dispense 
with class arbitration procedures unenforceable.”57 The plaintiffs, residents 
of California, argued that under this clause they had not agreed to arbitrate 
because the Discover rule barred class waivers at the time they enrolled in 
the defendant’s services.58 The district court disagreed, holding that Concep-
cion was retroactive.59 Because the FAA had always preempted laws barring 
class waivers, the plaintiffs could not rely on the Discover rule to negate the 
arbitration clause.60 
In a similar vein, arguments that the wording of the arbitration agree-
ment does not encompass the dispute at issue are likely to fall in light of the 
broad federal policy in favor of arbitration.61 In this circumstance, the parties 
 
 55. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (quoting 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010)). 
 56. 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 57. See id. at 1224. 
 58. See id. at 1225. 
 59. Id. at 1225–26. 
 60. See id. at 1226. Murphy is subject to criticism because it fails to acknowledge that 
the Discover rule and other similar rules have force where the FAA does not apply. For in-
stance, if the contract does not evidence interstate commerce, the Discover rule continues to 
have meaning because the FAA does not govern such contracts. If the Discover rule is not 
entirely void, there is no reason that the parties could not have referenced it to determine 
whether arbitration would be required. However, Murphy proceeds as if the Discover rule no 
longer has any conceivable application after Concepcion. The U.S. Supreme Court has re-
cently agreed to review a California state-court case that conflicts with Murphy. See DirecTV, 
Inc. v. Imburgia, 225 Cal. App. 4th 338 (2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3742 (U.S. Mar. 
23, 2015) (No. 14-462). 
 61. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 
(1983) (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitra-
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do not contest that they reached some agreement to arbitrate; rather, they 
dispute that the agreement requires them to arbitrate the subject matter of 
their lawsuit.62 An exemplary recent case is Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift Technolo-
gies, LLC.,63 in which the plaintiffs sought to litigate a Fair Labor Standards 
Act claim for failure to pay overtime wages.64 The defendant sought to en-
force an arbitration agreement that appeared in the plaintiffs’ noncompete 
agreement.65 The court reasoned that the first step was to determine whether 
the arbitration clause was broad or narrow.66 Because the clause stated that 
the parties agreed to arbitrate “[a]ny dispute, difference or unresolved ques-
tion,” the court found the clause to be broad and applied the rule that 
“[w]here the arbitration clause is broad, there arises a presumption of arbi-
trability.”67 The court rejected the argument that the clause should be limited 
because it appeared in the specific context of a noncompete agreement and 
did not concern issues such as overtime pay.68 Perhaps the narrowness of the 
contract created some ambiguity about whether the parties intended to arbi-
trate unrelated disputes.69 But that ambiguity did not matter, because “all 
ambiguities must be resolved in favor of arbitrability.”70 In short, under the 
reasoning of Sanchez, the so-called “rebuttable” presumption of arbitrability 
appears to be ironclad if the court designates an arbitration clause as 
“broad.” 
In contrast to linguistic challenges to the arbitration clause’s construc-
tion, a court might be more likely to preclude arbitration where the power 
dynamics between the parties and the nature of their interaction suggest that 
one party did not genuinely agree to arbitrate. For instance, in Nguyen v. 
Barnes & Noble Inc.,71 the defendant sought to enforce an arbitration provi-
 
tion agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contra-
ry.”). 
 62. The distinction between initial formation of an arbitration agreement and the scope 
of an agreement is an important one, for the federal policy in favor of arbitration does not 
apply to formation questions. See Druco Rests., Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., Inc., 765 F.3d 
776, 781 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he FAA’s policy in favor of arbitration applies when determin-
ing the scope of an agreement to arbitrate, but not when deciding whether there is an agree-
ment to arbitrate in the first instance.”). 
 63. 762 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 64. Id. at 1141. 
 65. See id. at 1143. 
 66. See id. at 1146 (quoting Cummings v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 404 F.3d 
1258, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
 67. See id. at 1146–47 (first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cum-
mings, 404 F.3d at 1261). 
 68. See id. at 1145–47. 
 69. See Sanchez, 762 F.3d at 1147. 
 70. See id. at 1147 (quoting Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 798 
(10th Cir. 1995)). 
 71. 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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sion that appeared in a “browsewrap” agreement.72 In a browsewrap agree-
ment, a corporation links to its terms and conditions at the bottom of a 
screen rather than requiring the consumer to (purportedly) read and click 
agreement.73 The court held that the plaintiff had not agreed to arbitrate be-
cause the link was not sufficiently conspicuous and there was no other evi-
dence that the plaintiff had seen the terms and conditions.74 However, Ngu-
yen does not reach to a situation where a corporation buries an arbitration 
agreement in fine print, so long as it actually gives the consumer the fine 
print.75 It merely prohibits the corporation from enforcing an arbitration 
clause that a consumer had to “ferret out” from the corporation’s website.76 
2. State-Law Defenses 
Besides formation arguments, consumers may also continue to assert 
state-law defenses against arbitration agreements—including an uncon-
scionability defense—when the situation warrants. Here the court must be 
careful not to run afoul of Concepcion’s command that state defenses cannot 
be used in a manner that disfavors arbitration.77 The Ninth Circuit grappled 
with this problem in Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co.78 There, the defend-
ant imposed an arbitration policy that was a condition of employment, that 
did not guarantee a neutral arbitrator, and that required the plaintiff to pay 
significant arbitration fees.79 The court held the arbitration provision to be 
unconscionable and then determined that the FAA did not preempt it.80 The 
court reasoned that Concepcion states a nondiscrimination rule: arbitration 
agreements must be treated the same as other contractual provisions.81 How-
ever, the fact that a defense merely implicates an arbitration provision does 
not mean that it treats the arbitration provision differently from other con-
tracts: “Of course, any state law that invalidated this provision would have a 
disproportionate impact on arbitration because the term is arbitration specif-
 
 72. See id. at 1174, 1176. 
 73. See id. at 1175–76 (citing Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d 
Cir. 2004)). 
 74. See id. at 1175–79. Stated verbatim, the court’s holding was “that where a website 
makes its terms of use available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but 
otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take any affirmative action to 
demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click 
on—without more—is insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.” Id. at 1179. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See supra Part II.A. 
 78. 733 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 79. See id. at 922–23. 
 80. See id. at 926–27. 
 81. See id. at 927. 
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ic. But viewed another way, invalidation of this term is agnostic towards 
arbitration. It does not disfavor arbitration; it provides that the arbitration 
process must be fair.”82 
Similarly, in Jackson v. Payday Financial, LLC,83 the Seventh Circuit 
held an arbitration provision unconscionable because it required the plaintiff 
to arbitrate on tribal lands that did not, in actual fact, have procedures for 
arbitration.84 The defendant argued that the unconscionability defense was 
arbitration-specific or else had a disproportionate impact on arbitration 
agreements.85 The court rejected this argument, stating that “[i]t hardly frus-
trates FAA provisions to void an arbitration clause on the ground that it con-
templates a proceeding for which the entity responsible for conducting the 
proceeding has no rules, guidelines, or guarantees of fairness.”86 
3. Reaction of Other State Courts 
While there are ways for consumers to avoid arbitration in federal 
court, they appear to be limited to truly egregious conduct by the party seek-
ing arbitration (such as penning a sham arbitration clause) or to situations 
where the consumer could not possibly have seen the arbitration language. 
As a result, state courts have created their own avenues for avoiding FAA 
preemption and “are eager to protect their traditional role as the final arbiter 
of contracts.”87 As a recent article in the Yale Law Journal attests, state 
courts have employed various strategies to escape Concepcion’s apparent 
command that arbitration clauses trump rules of state law.88 In California, 
courts have tended to limit Concepcion by holding that the FAA only 
preempts a state law that undermines the “fundamental attributes of arbitra-
tion.”89 Thus, if an arbitration clause allows only one party to recover attor-
ney’s fees, then the clause might be declared unconscionable because attor-
ney’s fees are not a unique attribute of bilateral arbitration.90 In Washington, 
the courts have read Concepcion to preempt only categorical uncon-
 
 82. Id. 
 83. 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 84. See id. at 779–81. 
 85. See id. at 778–79. 
 86. Id. at 779. 
 87. See James Dawson, Comment, Contract After Concepcion: Some Lessons from the 
State Courts, 124 YALE L.J. 233, 234 (2014). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 235–37 (citing Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 
2013)). 
 90. See id. at 236–37 (citing Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 773 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012)). 
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scionability rules, such as the Discover rule.91 Under this approach, the FAA 
prohibits unconscionability analysis only if it fails to account for the specific 
provisions of a given arbitration clause.92 In Missouri, the courts have used 
the language of procedural unconscionability to strike down clauses where 
there was a marked imbalance of bargaining power between the parties.93 
These cases are all based on the continued application of the uncon-
scionability defense after Concepcion. Arkansas has not been a leader on 
this front. The Yale piece suggests that Arkansas has merely “applied Con-
cepcion, but ha[s] done so while casting doubts on its wisdom.”94 But in 
actual fact, Arkansas courts may have gone further than the courts of any 
other state in counteracting the effects of Concepcion on consumer arbitra-
tion clauses. They have done so not through unconscionability analysis, 
however, but through another means: strict scrutiny of contract formation. 
The Arkansas courts’ development of formation doctrine—which rapidly 
gained speed in 2014—is the subject of Part III. 
III. THE ARKANSAS APPROACH 
The Arkansas Supreme Court has long employed a unique approach to 
contract formation in the context of arbitration.95 Specifically, the court has 
employed the “mutual obligation” doctrine to ensure that the parties are 
placed on equal footing in their ability to arbitrate (or litigate) a claim.96 
Because this doctrine goes to formation, it presumably falls outside the 
scope of the FAA and Concepcion—if the parties never formed an agree-
 
 91. See id. at 237 (citing Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197 (Wash. 
2013)). 
 92. See id. For example, in Concepcion, the arbitration clause had a number of provi-
sions favorable to the consumer, but the Discover rule nonetheless required the corporation to 
face claims in court. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744–45 (2011). 
Under the Washington approach, an arbitration clause might still be unconscionable if it 
forced the consumer to arbitrate in an inconvenient location or to face a biased arbitrator. 
 93. See Dawson, supra note 87, at 238 (citing Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 
486 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)). Dawson also notes that some courts might even maintain their 
authority under Concepcion by defining “arbitration” narrowly. See id. at 239–40. Thus, if an 
arbitration clause did not permit a neutral umpire, for example, the procedure would not be 
“arbitration” and thus would not be preempted by the FAA. See id. However, Dawson finds 
no court that has actually taken this approach and cites only a pre-Concepcion case that de-
fined “arbitration” narrowly. See id. (citing Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 94. See id. at 235 & n.13 (citing LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. McIllwain, 2013 Ark. 370, at 
7–9, 429 S.W.3d 261, 265). 
 95. For a comprehensive analysis of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s pre-2014 approach 
to arbitration cases, see Church, supra note 52. 
 96. See, e.g., Asbury Auto. Used Car Ctr., L.L.C. v. Brosh, 364 Ark. 386, 390–93, 220 
S.W.3d 637, 640–42 (2005). 
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ment to arbitrate, then the FAA has no role. A full decade of Arkansas juris-
prudence supports this approach, but 2014 was a high-water mark. As the 
law now stands, the mutual-obligation doctrine has received the full blessing 
of the Arkansas Supreme Court in a broad array of contexts. Not only that, 
but the court has also expanded its approach to strictly scrutinize mutuality 
of agreement, thus suggesting another way in which consumers might con-
test forced arbitration clauses. 
A. Pre-Concepcion 
Arkansas doctrine on mutual obligation was a product of the payday 
lending industry. In the first case to establish that an arbitration clause must 
be supported by mutual obligation, the plaintiffs sued a payday lender for 
violating Arkansas usury law.97 The defendant sought to compel arbitration 
on the basis of a clause that required the parties to submit to arbitration any 
claim “except, only, insofar as actions of [the defendant], to collect amounts 
due it.”98 The court first reviewed general Arkansas contract law. As the 
court explained, the formation of arbitration agreements is assessed by the 
same standards as contracts generally, which require (1) competent parties, 
(2) subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutual agreement, and (5) 
mutual obligations.99 Mutual obligation, the court further explained, means 
“that the terms of the agreement must fix a real liability upon both par-
ties.”100 The arbitration clause at issue failed to do that, because it permitted 
the payday lender, and only the payday lender, to litigate a specific set of 
claims.101 Therefore, it was void for lack of mutual obligation.102 
The mutual obligation rule was applied against payday lenders so many 
times that some argued it was specifically a payday lending rule.103 Howev-
er, the court made clear that it is applicable to arbitration clauses of all 
 
 97. See Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 342 Ark. 112, 114, 121, 27 
S.W.3d 361, 362, 366–67 (2000). The author of Showmethemoney is Lavenski Smith, cur-
rently a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See id. at 114, 27 
S.W.3d at 362; Active and Senior Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR EIGHTH CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/active-and-senior-judges (last visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
 98. Showmethemoney, 342 Ark. at 117, 27 S.W.3d at 364. 
 99. Id. at 119–20, 27 S.W.3d at 366 (citing Found. Telecomms. v. Moe Studio, 341 Ark. 
231, 16 S.W.3d 531 (2000); Hunt v. McIlroy Bank & Trust, 2 Ark. App. 87, 616 S.W.2d 759 
(1981)). 
 100. Id. at 121, 27 S.W.3d at 366 (citing Townsend v. Standard Indus., Inc., 235 Ark. 
951, 954–55, 363 S.W.2d 535, 537 (1962)). 
 101. See id., 27 S.W.3d at 366–67. 
 102. See id., 27 S.W.3d at 367. 
 103. See, e.g., Money Place, LLC v. Barnes, 349 Ark. 411, 78 S.W.3d 714 (2002); Cash 
in a Flash Check Advance of Ark., L.L.C. v. Spencer, 348 Ark. 459, 74 S.W.3d 600 (2002); 
E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 347 Ark. 132, 60 S.W.3d 436 (2001). 
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stripes in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Archer.104 That case involved a contract dis-
pute between a large pork processor and one of its producers.105 The contract 
contained an arbitration clause, but in a separate clause the contract also 
permitted Tyson to “pursue any other remedies at law or equity” upon the 
producer’s default.106 The court held that the arbitration provision lacked 
mutuality and restated its mutual obligation rule in the arbitration context: 
“[T]here is no mutuality where one party uses an arbitration agreement to 
shield itself from litigation, while at the same time reserving its own ability 
to pursue relief through the court system.”107 
One additional notable development occurred in Alltel Corp. v. 
Sumner,108 this one involving the requirement of mutual agreement. The 
defendant telephone company in that case sought to compel arbitration of a 
claim brought by its customers, asserting that the plaintiffs were subject to 
terms of service containing an arbitration clause.109 In support of this asser-
tion, the phone company produced an affidavit from one of its executives 
saying that the plaintiffs would have received the terms of service in the 
regular course of business.110 The court addressed the requirement of mutual 
agreement, holding that it required “notice as to the terms and subsequent 
assent.”111 The court then found that the phone company—the party seeking 
to compel arbitration—had failed to make this showing through the affidavit 
alone.112 Mutual agreement was lacking because there was “insufficient 
proof that [the plaintiffs] were given a contract which provided for the re-
quirement of arbitration.”113 
Tyson and Sumner thus culminated an active period in the development 
of arbitration law in Arkansas. These cases established two basic rules. First, 
to show mutual agreement, the party seeking arbitration must produce some 
evidence to show that the other party knew of and assented to the arbitration 
agreement.114 Second, the arbitration clause must treat the parties the 
same—if it allows one party to litigate a class of claims, then it is void for 
 
 104. 356 Ark. 136, 144–46, 147 S.W.3d 681, 686–87 (2004). 
 105. See id. at 139, 147 S.W.3d at 682–83. 
 106. See id. at 142–43, 147 S.W.3d at 685. 
 107. See id. at 146, 147 S.W.3d at 687 (citing E-Z Cash Advance, 347 Ark. 132, 60 
S.W.3d 436; Showmethemoney, 342 Ark. 112, 27 S.W.3d 361). The court did not comment 
on the fact that the provision of the contract that destroyed mutual obligation occurred out-
side the arbitration clause itself. See id. at 140–46, 147 S.W.3d at 683–88. However, this 
issue would flare up later, as discussed in Part III.B.3 infra. 
 108. 360 Ark. 573, 203 S.W.3d 77 (2005). 
 109. See id. at 574–75, 203 S.W.3d at 78–79. 
 110. See id. at 575, 203 S.W.3d at 79. 
 111. See id. at 576, 203 S.W.3d at 80. 
 112. See id. at 578, 203 S.W.3d at 81. 
 113. See id. at 576–79, 203 S.W.3d at 80–81. 
 114. See Sumner, 360 Ark. at 576–78, 203 S.W.3d at 80–81. 
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lack of mutual obligation.115 Though the court engaged in what might be 
seen as a modest expansion of this doctrine in 2012—finding a lack of mu-
tual obligation where one party was not permitted to seek a damages reme-
dy116—the contours of Arkansas arbitration law remained fairly well settled 
until 2014.117 
B. Major Developments in 2014 
Arbitration cases appeared frequently on the Arkansas Supreme 
Court’s docket in 2014, and almost every case either provided a major clari-
fication of arbitration law or established a new rule altogether. Moreover, 
most of these cases were pro-consumer. This Section examines three specif-
ic areas in which the court issued significant precedent: arbitration proce-
dure, mutual agreement, and—most significantly—mutual obligation. 
1. Arbitration Procedure 
A motion to compel arbitration presents two distinct questions. First, 
did the parties have an agreement to arbitrate in the first place? Second, and 
assuming that the answer to the first question is yes, does the party seeking 
 
 115. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Archer, 356 Ark. 136, 145–46, 147 S.W.3d 681, 687 
(2004). The court has not addressed the other three requirements for a valid contract—
competent parties, consideration, and “subject matter”—in the context of arbitration. The 
requirements of competent parties and consideration appear to be self-apparent. The require-
ment of subject matter appears to be meaningless. It is difficult to envision a contract that 
would be negated for lack of subject matter, and the court has never explained how that might 
happen. 
 116. See Independence Cnty. v. City of Clarksville, 2012 Ark. 17, at 7–8, 386 S.W.3d 
395, 400. Previous cases had found that arbitration clauses lacked mutual obligation because 
one party did not have to arbitrate claims at all. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, 356 Ark. 136, 147 
S.W.3d 681; Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 342 Ark. 112, 27 S.W.3d 
361 (2000). Independence County can be seen as an expansion because, even though each 
party had to arbitrate claims, the arbitration clause provided unequal remedies in arbitration. 
See Independence Cnty., 2012 Ark. 17, at 7–8, 386 S.W.3d at 400. 
 117. Notably, the disparity in Independence County favored the party opposing arbitra-
tion. The appellant in the case was a county that promised to provide electrical power; the 
appellee was a city that promised to purchase it. See Independence Cnty., 2012 Ark. 17, at 1, 
386 S.W.3d at 396. The arbitration clause prevented the arbitrator from awarding the county 
damages from the city for failure to purchase the power. See id. at 7–8, 386 S.W.3d at 400. 
The county sought to arbitrate despite this disadvantage, but the court invoked the mutual-
obligation rule against it. See id. at 3, 7–8, 386 S.W.3d at 398, 400. The broader point—
perhaps a subtle one but important all the same—is that a party disadvantaged by a lack of 
mutual obligation cannot waive the mutual-obligation issue. The clause must be mutual re-
gardless of which party seeks to enforce it. The court drove this point home more forcefully 
in a mutual-agreement case, Pine Hills Health & Rehabilitation, LLC v. Matthews, 2014 Ark. 
109, 431 S.W.3d 910, discussed infra Part III.B.2. 
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to avoid arbitration have a state contract-law defense available? A question 
of procedure then arises: Does a circuit court judge faced with a motion to 
compel arbitration have discretion to decide these questions in any order she 
prefers? 
In Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker,118 the court appeared to answer 
this question with an emphatic “no.” Before the circuit court in that case, the 
defendant moved to compel arbitration, and the plaintiffs argued both that 
there was no agreement to arbitrate and that the arbitration provision in the 
parties’ contract was unconscionable.119 The circuit court ruled only that the 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable, thereby acting on the defense 
before determining whether an arbitration agreement existed in the first 
place.120 The court explained that “[a] threshold inquiry is whether a valid 
agreement to arbitrate exists.”121 It therefore reversed and remanded for the 
circuit court to conduct this inquiry.122 
With Walker, the court appeared to provide lower courts with a clear 
rule: always address the existence of an arbitration agreement first. Howev-
er, the court added a caveat just over a month later in Asset Acceptance, LLC 
v. Newby.123 In that case, when faced with a motion to compel arbitration, 
the circuit court issued a statement from the bench indicating that, even if 
the parties had agreed to arbitrate, the plaintiff waived its right to arbitration 
by invoking the court’s jurisdiction.124 In other words, the circuit court as-
sumed without deciding that the parties had agreed to arbitrate. The circuit 
court then entered an order saying merely that the plaintiff’s “Motion to 
Compel Arbitration and Stay Plaintiff’s Complaint is denied.”125 As in 
Walker, the circuit court expressed no view of whether there was an agree-
ment to arbitrate in the first instance.126 However, the result was different 
this time. Notwithstanding the circuit court’s statement from the bench, the 
supreme court relied on its written order, which “simply state[d] that the 
motion is denied without specifying the basis for its decision.”127 The su-
preme court then applied the following rule: “[W]hen a circuit court denies a 
motion without expressly stating the basis for its ruling, that ruling encom-
passes the issues presented to the circuit court by the briefs and arguments 
 
 118. 2014 Ark. 223, 434 S.W.3d 357. Full disclosure: The author was counsel for the 
plaintiff on appeal in Walker. 
 119. Id. at 2–3, 434 S.W.3d at 359. 
 120. See id. at 5, 434 S.W.3d at 360. 
 121. Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 360. 
 122. Id. at 7, 434 S.W.3d at 361. 
 123. 2014 Ark. 280, 437 S.W.3d 119. 
 124. See id. at 3–4, 437 S.W.3d at 121. 
 125. See id. at 4, 437 S.W.3d at 121. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. at 6, 437 S.W.3d at 122–23. 
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of the parties.”128 The supreme court thus proceeded to the merits without 
remanding the case.129 
Walker and Newby establish a clear set of rules for obtaining arbitration 
orders from circuit courts and preserving issues for appeal. First, the written 
order—and not a statement from the bench—controls.130 Second, the circuit 
court must address formation issues first.131 However, the circuit court has 
some flexibility in the way it writes its orders. It need not issue detailed rea-
sons for its decision; instead, it need only issue a blanket denial of a motion 
to compel.132 If the party opposing arbitration has argued both formation and 
defenses, then the order encompasses both and both are preserved for ap-
peal.133 
These rules might be attacked as inconsistent with a coherent procedur-
al system. Indeed, some of the court’s own members have said as much in 
concurring opinions.134 Ultimately, however, the court’s procedural deci-
sions during the 2014 term have a notable substantive effect. By requiring a 
 
 128. Id., 437 S.W.3d at 123 (citing ARK. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 
395, 430 S.W.3d 49). 
 129. See id. at 7, 437 S.W.3d at 123. 
 130. See Newby, 2014 Ark. 280, at 6, 437 S.W.3d at 123 (citing Nat’l Home Ctrs., Inc. v. 
Coleman, 370 Ark. 119, 257 S.W.3d 862 (2007)). 
 131. See Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 Ark. 223, at 4, 434 S.W.3d 357, 360. 
 132. See Newby, 2014 Ark. 280, at 6–7, 437 S.W.3d at 123. 
 133. See id. at 6–7, 437 S.W.3d at 123. This approach entails additional pitfalls for liti-
gants, as illustrated by Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Kolesar, 2014 Ark. 
279, 2014 WL 2814816. There, the circuit court issued a blanket order denying the defend-
ant’s motion to compel arbitration. See id. at 4–5, 2014 WL 2814816, at *4–5. On appeal, the 
defendant addressed only a few of the arguments that the plaintiff had made in the circuit 
court (and thus that, per the Newby rule, the circuit court had ruled on). See id. at 6, 2014 WL 
2814816, at *6. The supreme court held that the circuit court’s decision must be affirmed 
because the appellant failed to address all of the plaintiff’s arguments in the circuit court: 
“[W]hen a circuit court bases its decision on more than one independent ground, as the circuit 
court did here when it denied the motion to compel arbitration in its entirety, and the appel-
lant challenges fewer than all those grounds on appeal, we will affirm without addressing any 
of the grounds.” Id. at 6, 2014 WL 2814816, at *6. Theoretically the rule makes sense: if a 
lower court rules against the appellant on a number of independent grounds, then the appel-
lant must convince the appellate court to reverse each ground in order to change the outcome. 
It is not realistic, however, to say that a circuit court that issues a blanket order denying arbi-
tration has agreed with every argument made by the party seeking to avoid arbitration. Newby 
thus creates a major inefficiency in appellate procedure by requiring an appellant to address 
every argument made in the circuit court, no matter how outlandish that argument might be. 
A better path is to require the circuit court to state the specific grounds for its rulings and to 
assume that it hasn’t considered any additional grounds argued. 
 134. See, e.g., GGNSC Holdings, LLC v. Chappel, 2014 Ark. 545, at 8, 453 S.W.3d 645, 
650. (Goodson, J., concurring) (“Bank of the Ozarks represents a clear departure from our 
traditional appellate rules governing contract cases, where we have never required a circuit 
court to rule on the existence of a contract before addressing any equitable defenses raised by 
the parties.”). 
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circuit court to address formation, whether directly or in a blanket order, 
formation is always at issue in an appeal. And because, unlike defense-based 
rules, formation-based rules are not susceptible to FAA preemption under 
Concepcion, the Arkansas Supreme Court has much more breathing space to 
consider the validity of arbitration clauses. The court has taken full ad-
vantage of that breathing space, as is apparent in its recent cases on mutual 
agreement and mutual obligation. 
2. Mutual Agreement 
Alltel Corp. v. Sumner has been the most important precedent on mutu-
al agreement since it was issued in 2005. As explained above, that case es-
sentially establishes an evidentiary rule: the party seeking arbitration must 
submit proof to show the other party’s notice of and assent to the arbitration 
provision.135 The court did not change the basic framework of that approach 
in 2014. However, in two separate cases, it stiffened its position on the evi-
dence that a party must bring to show mutual agreement. 
The first case was Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Newby.136 After issuing the 
procedural ruling discussed in Part III.B.1, the court turned to the question 
of whether there was mutual agreement to arbitrate.137 The purported arbitra-
tion provision appeared in a credit card agreement that the plaintiff, a debt 
collector, claimed to have acquired.138 After the defendant countersued, the 
plaintiff sought to compel arbitration and attached a copy of the credit card 
agreement. However, the agreement was unsigned, and the plaintiff offered 
no additional evidence connecting the defendant to the agreement.139 The 
plaintiff instead argued that the defendant’s use of the credit card constituted 
acceptance of the arbitration terms.140 However, the defendant denied she 
had ever used the card, and the circuit court made no factual finding that she 
did.141 Thus, the court refused to compel arbitration and held that the plain-
tiff failed to show that the defendant had agreed to arbitrate.142 
While Newby might be viewed as a straightforward application of 
Sumner, the court’s decision in Pine Hills Health & Rehabilitation, LLC v. 
Matthews143 was not so modest. In that case, the defendant sought to compel 
arbitration on the basis of an arbitration agreement that the plaintiff’s repre-
 
 135. See Alltel Corp. v. Sumner, 360 Ark. 573, 576–79, 203 S.W.3d 77, 80–81 (2005). 
 136. 2014 Ark. 280, 437 S.W.3d 119. 
 137. See id. at 7, 437 S.W.3d at 123. 
 138. See id. at 2–3, 437 S.W.3d at 120–21. 
 139. See id. at 9, 437 S.W.3d at 124. 
 140. See id. at 2, 9, 437 S.W.3d at 120, 124. 
 141. Id. at 9, 437 S.W.3d at 124. 
 142. Newby, 2014 Ark. 280, at 11, 437 S.W.3d at 125. 
 143. 2014 Ark. 109, 431 S.W.3d 910. 
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sentative had signed.144 The agreement was a three-page document, but the 
defendant submitted only the first two pages.145 The third page contained a 
signature line for the defendant.146 The court held that the lack of the de-
fendant’s signature, coupled with the lack of any other evidence regarding 
conduct that would evidence the defendant’s assent, meant that mutual 
agreement was lacking.147 
The result in Matthews is striking—the defendant had required the 
plaintiff to sign the arbitration clause, so clearly it believed arbitration was 
appropriate. While it is well established that a party may assent to a contract 
through actions as well as through documents, typically the issue is whether 
the person seeking to avoid an agreement has acted in a manner consistent 
with the agreement.148 Whatever the merits of its logic, though, Matthews 
puts defendants on notice of their strict responsibility to produce evidence 
showing that both parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute. 
3. Mutual Obligation 
Though the court’s mutual-agreement decisions favored consumers, 
those decisions could arguably be confined to their facts and therefore be of 
limited precedential importance. In two cases involving mutual obligation, 
however, the court made significant structural changes that are likely to 
have a deep impact on the enforceability of consumer arbitration clauses in 
Arkansas. 
The first case, Regional Care of Jacksonville, LLC v. Henry,149 in-
volved a dispute between a nursing home and a patient. The plaintiff’s ad-
mission agreement contained an arbitration clause that, in form at least, im-
posed mutual obligations on the parties: it provided “that any dispute be-
tween the Parties, other than a dispute over billing or collecting for ser-
vices,” would be arbitrated.150 Thus the parties each agreed to arbitrate dis-
putes, except the parties agreed not to arbitrate billing disputes.151 However, 
the court cut through this formal mutuality and held that, as a realistic mat-
ter, only the defendant nursing home, and not the individual patient, was 
 
 144. See id. at 2, 431 S.W.3d at 912. 
 145. See id. at 4, 431 S.W.3d at 913. 
 146. Id., 431 S.W.3d at 913. 
 147. See id. at 7–8, 431 S.W.3d at 915–16. 
 148. For example, in DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, the court explained “that a party, by know-
ingly accepting the benefits of a proposed contract, is bound by its terms.” 2012 Ark. 366, at 
8, 423 S.W.3d 555, 561–62. However, the court found that the plaintiff in that case had not 
agreed to arbitrate when she cancelled a twelve-month contract nine or ten days after initially 
signing it. See id. at 9, 423 S.W.3d at 562. 
 149. 2014 Ark. 361, 444 S.W.3d 356. 
 150. See id. at 3, 444 S.W.3d at 358. 
 151. See id., 444 S.W.3d at 358. 
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likely to have a billing dispute that it would bring to court.152 “By reserving 
the right to litigate billing or collection disputes,” the court explained, “[the 
defendant] excluded from arbitration the only likely claim it might have 
against a resident.”153 Because the practical effect of the arbitration provi-
sion was to permit only the nursing home to access a court, mutual obliga-
tion was lacking and there was no agreement to arbitrate.154 
The approach in Henry was not an entirely new one. Henry extensively 
discusses E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris,155 a payday-lender case holding 
that an arbitration clause allowing each party to access small claims court 
lacked mutuality because the payday lender was likely to use no other venue 
and thus could never be forced to arbitrate.156 However, Henry is important 
for its firm rejection of a formal mutuality rule. It is not enough that the par-
ties are theoretically put on the same footing. Rather, the court will take a 
close look at the realities of the situation to determine whether, in practice, 
only one party has court access or whether the parties are otherwise given 
unequal rights in regard to arbitration. 
The court drove this point home in Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow,157 the most 
sweeping arbitration decision of the 2014 term. In that case, the parties’ con-
tract contained an arbitration clause that seemed to be a model of mutuality, 
apparently requiring both parties to arbitrate any and all disputes.158 Howev-
er, the court focused on a term that appeared prior to the arbitration clause: 
“If we do not enforce any right or remedy available under this Agreement, 
that failure is not a waiver.”159 The court interpreted this clause as “an ‘out’ 
to the required arbitration.”160 Because “Alltel, and only Alltel, was permit-
ted to reject [arbitration] without consequence,” mutual obligation was lack-
ing and there was no agreement to arbitrate.161 
Though Rosenow is couched in the language of previous mutual-
obligation cases—that one party cannot reserve litigation to itself while 
denying it to another party—it appears to be much broader. In fact, the mu-
tuality-destroying clause that the court cites says nothing about whether 
Alltel can reject arbitration. Quite the reverse is true: it permits Alltel to 
access arbitration when the other party lacks that access. The clause indeed 
treats the parties differently, though not for the reasons the court seems to 
 
 152. See id. at 8, 444 S.W.3d at 361. 
 153. Id., 444 S.W.3d at 361. 
 154. See id., 444 S.W.3d at 361. 
 155. See Henry, 2014 Ark. 361, at 7–8, 444 S.W.3d at 360–61. 
 156. See E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 347 Ark. 132, 141, 60 S.W.3d 436, 442 
(2001). 
 157. 2014 Ark. 375, 2014 WL 4656609. 
 158. See id. at 7, 2014 WL 4656609, at *4. 
 159. See id. at 7–8, 2014 WL 4656609, at *4. 
 160. See id. at 8, 2014 WL 4656609, at *4. 
 161. See id. at 8–9, 2014 WL 4656609, at *4. 
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think. Typically if a party litigates a case long enough, it cannot later change 
course and attempt to compel arbitration.162 The doctrine of waiver may pre-
clude a party from arbitrating if it “[s]ubstantially invoke[s] the litigation 
machinery before asserting its arbitration right.”163 The cited clause excepts 
Alltel—but not its customers—from this waiver rule.164 The court’s charac-
terization of the contract in Rosenow may be askew, but the principle re-
mains: an arbitration provision may not treat parties differently, whether the 
difference occurs in their ability to access courts or in some other fashion. 
And by taking the mutual obligation doctrine beyond the context of previous 
cases, the court signaled a heightened requirement for finding mutual obli-
gation. 
Rosenow is notable for two additional reasons. First, it clarified a point 
that was already implicit in the court’s previous arbitration rulings: that a 
court may look outside the arbitration clause itself to interpret the clause’s 
meaning.165 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the court rejected the 
argument that Arkansas’s mutual-obligation doctrine runs afoul of the FAA 
by placing arbitration agreements on different footing from contracts in gen-
eral.166 Because mutual obligation is a requirement for the formation of all 
contracts, and not for the formation of arbitration agreements alone, Con-
cepcion did not apply and the FAA did not preempt Arkansas’s mutuality 
doctrine.167 
With Rosenow, the court has created a robust doctrine that requires ar-
bitration clauses to contain equality in every aspect. Now it is not difficult to 
imagine an arbitration clause failing the test because only one side gets to 
 
 162. See Lewallen v. Green Tree Servicing, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 163. See id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ritzel Commc’ns v. Mid-Am. Cellular Tel. 
Co., 989 F.2d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
 164. See Rosenow, 2014 Ark. 375, at 8, 2014 WL 4656609, at *4. That much is plain 
from the wording of the clause: “If we do not enforce any right or remedy available under this 
Agreement, that failure is not a waiver.” Id., 2014 WL 4656609, at *4. This sentence permits 
only “we”—i.e., the drafter—to protect itself from the waiver doctrine. Thus, if Alltel has 
litigated a matter against a customer for a period of time but then decided it would rather 
arbitrate, the contract gives it that right. However, the waiver doctrine would operate against 
a consumer in the same situation. 
 165. See id. at 7 n.4, 2014 WL 4656609, at *4 n.4 (citing Advance Am. Servicing of Ark., 
Inc. v. McGinnis, 375 Ark. 24, 289 S.W.3d 37 (2008)) (“This court has previously rejected 
an appellant’s assertion that it was error for the circuit court to consider another provision in 
the contract, that was outside and independent of the arbitration provision, when evaluating 
the validity of the arbitration provision and determining that it lacked mutuality.”). 
 166. See id. at 9–11, 2014 WL 4656609, at *5–6. 
 167. See id. at 10–11, 2014 WL 4656609, at *5–6. Notably, while there was a dissenting 
opinion in Rosenow that split the court four to three, the split had nothing to do with the mer-
its of the court’s analysis. See id. at 11–17, 2014 WL 4656609, at *6–9 (Goodson, J., dissent-
ing). Rather, it had only to do with whether all necessary issues had been decided in the cir-
cuit court and whether certain issues had been preserved for appeal. See id., 2014 WL 
4656609, at *6–9. 
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pick the arbitrator, or because fees are unevenly distributed, or for any num-
ber of other reasons. Moreover, because mutuality is a formation issue, it is 
apparently outside the scope of Concepcion and the FAA. Still, questions 
remain. Could Arkansas’s new, more expansive approach survive a federal 
challenge? And, notwithstanding future legal developments, is Arkansas’s 
new approach good policy? Those questions are the subject of Part IV. 
IV. ASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS OF THE ARKANSAS 
APPROACH 
A. Viability of Arkansas’s Doctrine 
The precedent discussed in Part III is the governing law in any litiga-
tion in Arkansas state court concerning arbitration. However, many cases in 
which arbitration issues arise appear in federal court, not state court. Under 
the Erie doctrine, the forum shouldn’t matter to the outcome.168 Assuming 
that a choice-of-law analysis dictates the application of Arkansas law in a 
given dispute, then Arkansas contract law—including its mutual-obligation 
doctrine—should apply to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. 
However, as discussed further below, federal courts in Arkansas have been 
defiant of Arkansas arbitration rules and have held them preempted by the 
FAA. Moreover, because FAA preemption raises a federal question under 
the Supremacy Clause, it is possible (though perhaps unlikely) that the U.S. 
Supreme Court would hear a direct appeal from An Arkansas Supreme 
Court case applying mutual-obligation doctrine. Does Arkansas’s expanded 
arbitration law overreach in light of Concepcion’s more aggressive preemp-
tion posture? 
To fully assess that question, one must first address a couple of the 
more arcane points of arbitration law. An antecedent question presents itself 
in any arbitration dispute: Who decides whether a given question should be 
arbitrated, the court or the arbitrator? This question is shadowed by Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,169 an early FAA case in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court may only address challenges 
to an arbitration provision itself, not challenges to the entire contract in 
which the arbitration clause appears.170 While the court makes the initial 
 
 168. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[I]n all cases where a 
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the 
parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same.”). 
 169. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 170. See id. at 403–04. 
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determination of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate,171 it must base that 
determination on reasons specific to the arbitration clause and may not re-
fuse to compel arbitration because of a flaw in the contract as a whole. Put 
another way, a party may not bootstrap a challenge to the contract as a 
whole to a challenge to an arbitration provision.172 Thus, the Court has cre-
ated a sort of fiction that isolates the arbitration clause from the rest of the 
contract when determining whether arbitration is required.173 
Contrast the Prima Paint rule to the rule of preemption stated in Doc-
tor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.174 There, the Court reviewed a decision 
of the Montana Supreme Court holding an arbitration clause unenforceable 
because, contrary to a state statute, notice of the clause was not “typed in 
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.”175 The Montana 
court held that the statute was not preempted because it did not interfere 
with the purposes of the FAA—it merely ensured conspicuous disclosure of 
the arbitration clause.176 The Supreme Court disagreed. The relevant ques-
tion was not whether the state law interfered with arbitration, but whether 
the state law targeted arbitration specifically: “Courts may not . . . invalidate 
arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provi-
sions.”177 Because the Montana law required only arbitration clauses to be 
written in a certain way, it was preempted.178 
At first glance, the Prima Paint rule might seem incompatible with 
Casarotto’s preemption rule: the first tells courts to review only the arbitra-
tion clause; the second tells courts not to accept contract defenses that are 
targeted only at the arbitration clause. However, the apparent contradiction 
 
 171. There is an exception to this rule as well: the parties may agree to submit the ques-
tion of arbitrability to the arbitrator rather than the court if they do so in clear terms. See First 
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 
 172. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) 
(“[U]nless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is 
considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.”). 
 173. As explained further below, the Prima Paint rule does not say that the arbitration 
clause must be interpreted without reference to any other provision of the contract. Rather, it 
means that a party cannot avoid arbitration by challenging the entire contract instead of the 
arbitration clause itself. Using other portions of the contract to shed light on the meaning of 
the arbitration clause does not violate Prima Paint. To the contrary, it is elementary that 
specific provisions of a contract are to be interpreted in light of the whole. See Alexander v. 
McEwen, 367 Ark. 241, 244, 239 S.W.3d 519, 522 (2006) (quoting Coleman v. Regions 
Bank, 364 Ark. 59, 65, 216 S.W.3d 569, 574 (2005)) (“It is . . . a well-settled rule in constru-
ing a contract that the intention of the parties is to be gathered, not from particular words and 
phrases, but from the whole context of the agreement.”). 
 174. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
 175. See id. at 683–84 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)). 
 176. See id. at 684–85. 
 177. See id. at 687 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 
(1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987)). 
 178. See id. 
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dissolves when it is considered that the first rule is limited to the procedural 
question of arbitrability while the second regards substantive state law. Pri-
ma Paint requires the court to address only the arbitration clause.179 This 
rule protects the purposes of the FAA: if the arbitration clause is valid, then 
it would be wrong for the court to address broader contract issues because 
the parties have an enforceable agreement to arbitrate those questions. How-
ever, Prima Paint says nothing about the law that is to apply when assessing 
the validity of the arbitration clause.180 Casarotto says that state contract 
defenses apply, but only if the defense does not take arbitration as its sole 
subject.181 These two rules—requiring the court to focus on the arbitration 
clause as a matter of procedure but to strike laws that discriminate against 
arbitration as a matter of substance—are in reality complementary. 
Nevertheless, the apparent tension in these doctrines appears to have 
affected the Arkansas federal courts, which have steadfastly held that the 
FAA preempts Arkansas mutual-obligation doctrine. The key case is Ender-
lin v. XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc.182 In that case, the court held Arkan-
sas’s mutual-obligation rule preempted by the FAA.183 The court first ex-
plained that “lack of mutual obligations is a generally applicable contract 
defense.”184 The court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that, per Prima 
Paint, the arbitration clause must be assessed for mutual obligation by it-
self.185 Instead, it held that “Arkansas law requiring mutuality within the 
arbitration paragraph itself is preempted by the FAA because it places the 
arbitration clause on unequal footing with other contract terms that do not 
each have to be mutual.”186 Enderlin has since provided the dispositive rule 
in Arkansas federal courts, which tend to parrot its holding without further 
analysis.187 
 
 179. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967). 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686–87. 
 182. No. 4:06-CV-0032 GTE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27668 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 25, 2008). 
 183. See id. at *31. 
 184. Id. at *24. 
 185. See id. at *25–31. 
 186. Id. at *31. 
 187. See Clements v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 4:13-cv-4048, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40055, at 
*11–12 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 26, 2014); Weaver v. Edward D. Jones & Co., No. 4:10CV00227 
BSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65762, at *4–5 (E.D. Ark. June 10, 2010). These cases also 
suggest that an Eighth Circuit case, Southeastern Stud & Components, Inc. v. American Eagle 
Design Build Studios, LLC, 588 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2009), held that the FAA preempts the 
Arkansas mutual-obligation rule. See Clements, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40055, at *11–12; 
Weaver, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65762, at *5. That suggestion is incorrect. Southeastern Stud 
held only that the defendant had waived arbitration by failing to request it in a timely fashion. 
See Southeastern Stud, 588 F.3d at 966–69. The defendant’s primary argument was that 
Enderlin changed the law and that it could not have been expected to request arbitration 
before that case came out. See id. at 966–68. The Eighth Circuit disagreed and said that the 
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Further analysis is warranted. A closer look suggests several errors in 
Enderlin’s reasoning that make its conclusion appear untenable. First, 
Enderlin is wrong to state that lack of mutual obligation is a “defense.”188 It 
is instead an element of contract formation: no agreement exists in the first 
place because an essential element under Arkansas law is lacking. This dis-
tinction is crucial. If the parties never agreed to arbitrate, the FAA plays no 
role at all. Under the FAA’s savings clause, however, defenses are subject to 
preemption if they are specifically targeted at arbitration.189 Second, Ender-
lin provides no explanation for its contention that other contractual terms 
“do not each have to be mutual.”190 Indeed, as discussed above, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that its mutuality doctrine applies 
to contracts generally, not just to arbitration clauses.191 
Enderlin’s flaws aside, the Arkansas approach to mutual obligation 
might still be vulnerable were it to be challenged before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. First, the willingness of the Arkansas courts to look outside the arbi-
tration clause to determine mutuality might be said to violate Prima Paint. If 
Prima Paint requires the challenge to be to the arbitration clause itself, is the 
court not forbidden from looking outside that clause, as it did when it looked 
to the waiver clause in Rosenow?192 Even were this question significant 
enough to merit the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court, the objection ap-
pears to be meritless on closer examination. Looking outside the arbitration 
clause is perfectly permissible if done in order to give meaning to the clause. 
In Rosenow, for example, the court held that the waiver provision gave addi-
tional meaning to the arbitration clause by exhibiting that only one party 
could shield itself from arbitration.193 It did not hold that the waiver clause 
itself was invalid.194 Under Prima Paint, only the arbitrator could make that 
call if the parties agreed to arbitrate.195 But because formation of an agree-
ment to arbitrate is an antecedent question, and because one portion of a 
contract may shed light on another portion, it is permissible for a court to 
interpret an arbitration clause in light of other contractual provisions. 
 
defendant could have made a preemption argument along the lines of Enderlin from the out-
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A more serious issue is whether the Arkansas approach is viable in 
light of Concepcion. No federal court in Arkansas has addressed Concep-
cion’s impact on the Arkansas mutuality rule—instead, they have rotely 
followed Enderlin, a case that predates Concepcion.196 Say that Enderlin 
were erased and the Arkansas federal courts began on a fresh slate: would 
Concepcion nevertheless produce the same result? 
The Fourth Circuit addressed that question in Noohi v. Toll Brothers, 
Inc.197 The case involved Maryland’s so-called Cheek rule—a mutual-
obligation requirement strikingly similar to the one reaffirmed in 
Rosenow.198 The court proceeded in three stages. First, it rejected the argu-
ment that the arbitration clause was valid if the entire contract was support-
ed by consideration or a mutual exchange of promises.199 Maryland law re-
quired an assessment of mutuality within the arbitration clause alone, and 
this was consistent with the rule in Prima Paint.200 Second, the court exam-
ined the arbitration clause and held that it lacked mutuality because it “un-
ambiguously binds only the buyer.”201 Finally, it addressed Concepcion and 
found it inapplicable for three reasons.202  
First, the Cheek rule did not undermine the fundamental attributes of 
arbitration.203 It “neither increases formality nor risks to defendants; it mere-
ly requires that for an arbitration provision to be valid, both parties [had to] 
bind themselves to it.”204 Thus, the Cheek rule did not implicate the primary 
concern of Concepcion.205 Second, though the court recognized the concern 
that the Cheek rule discriminated against arbitration, it concluded that “all 
Cheek does is treat an arbitration provision like any stand-alone contract, 
requiring consideration.”206 Finally, and more broadly, the Cheek rule did 
not disfavor arbitration; rather, “Cheek can just as readily be viewed as en-
couraging arbitration by requiring that both parties to an arbitration agree-
ment bind themselves to arbitrate at least some categories of claims.”207 
 
 196. See, e.g., Clements v. DirecTV, LLC, No. 4:13-cv-4048, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Noohi brings a welcome clear-
headedness to the analysis of FAA preemption. In a world where arbitration 
has become a ubiquitous topic of litigation, it can certainly seem like doc-
trines such as the Cheek rule are targeted at arbitration. Yet if those doc-
trines are applied to contracts in general—as the Arkansas Supreme Court 
has insisted its mutual-obligation doctrine is—then what looks like discrim-
ination may actually be an illusion born of aggressive arbitration practices. 
Moreover, Noohi reminds us that Concepcion has limits. If a state-law rule 
has the overall effect of ensuring that both parties are able to arbitrate, then 
where is the offense to the pro-arbitration policies of the FAA? Permitting 
only one party to be bound to an arbitration clause may be consistent with 
forced arbitration, but there is nothing in the rule of mutuality that is hostile 
to arbitration per se. 
B. Practical Benefits 
Outside of the legal arguments addressed above, there is another ques-
tion about the approach Arkansas has taken to arbitration: Does it make 
good policy? Anything beyond a brief discussion of that issue—at the crux 
of much of the debate over arbitration today—exceeds the scope of this Ar-
ticle. However, the following suggests four areas where the Arkansas ap-
proach has produced salutary results: (1) federalism, (2) ensuring consent to 
waiver of rights, (3) evening the playing field between consumers and cor-
porate drafters of contracts, and (4) ensuring adequate development of con-
sumer law. 
1. Federalism 
Contract law is undoubtedly a matter of state concern and is traditional-
ly within the domain of state law.208 Of course, the federal government can 
regulate contracts if it has constitutional authority to do so, which it does 
frequently under the broad reach of the commerce power.209 In this sense, 
the FAA is an unremarkable statute—it regulates contracts under a legiti-
mate constitutional power to do so (again, the Commerce Clause).210 How-
ever, Concepcion has gone further to remove state authority over contracts 
 
 208. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 474 (1989) (“[T]he interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state 
law, which this Court does not sit to review.”). 
 209. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).The Fair Labor Standards Act, 
for example, comprehensively regulates employment contracts under the commerce power. 
See id. at 109–10. 
 210. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 276–77 (1995) (stating 
that Congress intended to use its “commerce power to the full” when it passed the FAA). 
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than any other case interpreting the FAA. And the breadth of its language 
puts courts at liberty to defang state law. 
Take for instance Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., a Ninth Circuit case dis-
cussed above.211 Murphy is not simply a straightforward application of Con-
cepcion; it does not hold that California’s Discover rule is preempted be-
cause it conflicts with the FAA.212 Rather, it holds that the FAA “nullifies” 
the Discover Bank rule.213 But surely that statement is too broad. If the par-
ties entered a contract that did not implicate interstate commerce, for exam-
ple, and one party tried to enforce an arbitration provision within that con-
tract, then the FAA would by its terms not apply and a California court 
would be free to impose the Discover Bank rule. Simply put, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that Concepcion destroys an area of traditional state regulation, 
when in fact it merely precludes it. What’s more, Murphy presented a fairly 
straightforward case because it involved the very rule of state law that Con-
cepcion dealt with. When it is considered that Concepcion preempts any 
state law that might interfere with the fundamental attributes of arbitration, 
its intrusion into areas of traditional state regulation could be very thorough 
indeed. 
The Arkansas approach permissibly escapes this problem by emphasiz-
ing formation issues. Arkansas courts thereby preserve for themselves a 
sizable sphere of regulation—one in which they can both maintain a healthy 
state/federal balance and protect Arkansas citizens from unfair arbitration 
practices. 
2. Consent 
The Arkansas approach to mutual agreement contends with the prob-
lem of consent discussed in the opening of this Article. By closely scrutiniz-
ing the parties’ interactions for mutual agreement, cases such as Newby en-
sure that parties to an arbitration clause knew of its terms and in fact wanted 
to be bound by them. Indeed, the mutual-agreement rule is consistent with 
the many U.S. Supreme Court cases repeating the principle that arbitration is 
a matter of consent.214 
However, the limitations of the Arkansas approach in this regard 
should be noted. In many instances there will be evidence showing that a 
party indeed clicked on the box agreeing to terms, or that the consumer did 
receive notice of the terms in the product packaging, and in the legal sense 
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this can create consent.215 In these situations, the only way to ensure consent 
in a meaningful way is a legal rule that moves the moment of choice from 
the time of entering the initial contract to the time at which the arbitration is 
actually requested. But such a rule would be targeted at arbitration specifi-
cally and is therefore unsustainable. 
3. Even Playing Field Between Contract Drafters and Consumers 
The Arkansas approach is more likely to be effective with its mutual-
obligation doctrine. Mutual obligation is the Golden Rule: provide arbitra-
tion (or litigation) as you would have another provide it to you. This re-
quirement is especially important in the consumer context, where in many 
cases contracts give the corporation the right to unilaterally amend the con-
tract post-formation. Such amendments may, of course, include the addition 
of an arbitration provision.216 Assuming that a consumer can, in fact, be 
deemed to have agreed to an arbitration provision that the corporate drafter 
added unilaterally, then the mutual obligation doctrine is a powerful protec-
tion from abuse of adhesive contracts. Without the doctrine, corporations 
can easily insert unbalanced terms that favor themselves and that permit 
themselves alone to access courts where they deem it convenient. The mutu-
al obligation doctrine puts a check on that practice. 
The doctrine also requires a corporation to think hard about whether it 
really wants to arbitrate its own claims. Traditional litigation, after all, has 
special benefits that the corporation may wish to avail itself of, such as ef-
fective appeal procedures and free access to courts (as opposed to costly 
arbitrator fees).217 Because of the mutual-obligation doctrine, a corporation 
is less likely to insert an arbitration clause into its contract as a knee-jerk 
reaction and more likely to give thoughtful consideration to the costs and 
benefits of arbitration—including the costs to its customers. 
4. Law Development 
Arbitrators may be competent at dispute resolution, but they lack one 
power that judges unquestionably have: the power to interpret law with 
binding authority. Arbitrators do not always issue reasoned opinions. Even 
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where they do, it is unlikely that their decisions will influence other arbitra-
tors in future cases or provide guidance for future conduct.218 Moreover, in 
the consumer context, obtaining arbitral precedent would at the very least 
require consumers to actually conduct the arbitration when a court compels 
it to do so. However, without class procedures, there is often little incentive 
for consumers to arbitrate small claims. Either way, an order compelling 
arbitration ensures that a court will not provide an authoritative interpreta-
tion of the consumer law at issue. When arbitration is the rule, development 
of the law suffers.219 
V. CONCLUSION 
Arkansas has always been jealous of its prerogatives when regulating 
contracts that include arbitration clauses, but with a series of cases in the 
2014 term, it staked itself a unique position in the post-Concepcion land-
scape. Some may question whether that position is legally sustainable in 
light of what appears to be an all-engulfing Federal Arbitration Act. Howev-
er, Concepcion has its limits, and the Arkansas approach does not transgress 
them. Moreover, that approach helps ensure that the principles of federal-
ism, true consent, and fair dealing are honored. Unless the U.S. Supreme 
Court expands the FAA even further, Arkansas law will continue to provide 
a bulwark against unbalanced arbitration provisions. 
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